# OFFSHORE

NUMBER 41 AP[illegible] 1978 PRICE 50¢*

# The cruising yachtsman's engine

| | |
|---|---|
| STW2MGR | 20 at 2,300 r.p.m. |
| STW3MGR | 30 at 2,300 r.p.m. |
| HRW3MGR | 44 at 2,200 r.p.m. |
| HRW4MGR | 59 at 2,200 r.p.m. |
| HRW6MGR | 88 at 2,200 r.p.m. |
| JW6MGR | 138 at 2,000 r.p.m. |
| JWS6MGR | 170 at 2,000 r.p.m. |
| JWSC6MGR | 250 at 2,000 r.p.m. |

MARINE AUX GEN SETS

| | |
|---|---|
| LT1MA | 5 KVA |
| STW2MA | 8 KVA |
| STW3MA | 12 KVA |
| HRW3MA | 25 KVA |

*Air cooled models also available*

Simplicity. Reliability. Economical operation. Three powerful reasons to investigate the Lister option for cruising yachts from 6m to 20m in steel, timber, ferro-cement and G.R.P. Engines up to 88 b.h.p. are fitted with both raised hand and electric start, as standard equipment. Choose from these water-cooled, propulsion models from 20 to 250 b.h.p.



**STW2MGR**



**STW3MGR**

Lister

MARINE DIESELS

HAWKER SIDDELEY

R.A. LISTER AUSTRALIA

Head Office: 65 Marigold Street, Revesby, N.S.W. 2212. Tel.: 771 4911
Qld.: 316 Evans Road, Salisbury Nth. 4107. Tel.: 277 6311
Vic.: 10 Nicholson Street, East Coburg. 3058. Tel.: 386 9124
S.A.: 108 Rundle Street, Kent Town. 5067. Tel.: 42 4482
W.A.: 151-153 Guildford Road, Bassendean. 6054. Tel.: 279 4100
Tas.: South—R. L. Ditcham Pty. Ltd.; North—Glasgow Engineering

LMP1

# OFFSHORE

Number 41 April/May 1978




*On the slips at the C.Y.C. Rushcutters Bay, Sydney. The C.Y.C. yard draws praise from visiting International yachtsmen (see comments by Britain's John Coote, page 12).*

*Photo by D. Colfelt.*

Registered for posting as a publication—Category (B)

**FEATURES**



'Offshore' is published every two months by the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia, New Beach Road, Darling Point, N.S.W. 2027. Telephone 32 9731, Cables "SEAWYSEA"

Advertising and Editorial material:
The Editor, 'Offshore', C/ C.Y.C.A.

Subscriptions: Australia $5.50. Overseas $7.00.
Air Mail rate on application.

Editor: David J. Colfelt

Printer: Wymond Morell (Printers) Pty. Ltd.
160 Parramatta Road, Camperdown, N.S.W. 2050

*Recommended price only

# HOBART 1977:

## *Report of retirements in the 1977 Race*

The recent Hitachi Sydney-Hobart Yacht Race commenced in a light easterly breeze, but by the time 24 hours had elapsed the fleet encountered the first of the three cold fronts which had been predicted at the pre-race briefing by the Commonwealth Meterological Service. Winds of generally 50 knots, though occasionally reported higher, (in gusts ?) were common, and the direction was SSW to SSE. Since the course was South, all yachts were obliged to come hard on the wind.

Retirements commenced shortly after the passage of the first front, and by the time the second change had gone through, the seas had built up steeply.

The fleet was stretched between Batemans Bay and Gabo Is. at the time of the passage of the first front, poised on the edge of Bass Strait, with four or five alternative ports of good shelter close at hand.

At the briefing, competitors had been counselled, "In light of the forecasts, make a conscious decision at Gabo Is., whether to go without shelter, unless you feel confident you can make it. Search and rescue in that area will be difficult".

A heavy retirement rate therefore did not surprise the Race Officials plotting the fleet's progress back at the C.Y.C.A. Race Communications Centre, or on the radio relay ship accompanying the fleet.

Because of the widespread interest of yachting administrators both local and overseas, and the general public, brought on by the excellent media coverage throughout the Race, the C.Y.C.A. Sailing Committee circulated a confidential questionnaire to all skippers who had retired immediately upon the Race's conclusion, and the results of this questionnaire (in generalities and statistics), together with information gathered first hand by the Race Committee, are tabulated below. (The number of questionnaire responses plus first-hand inspections totalled 55 out of the 58 retirements, and the Sailing Committee has therefore accepted this as a total response for the purpose of statistical analysis.)

| | |
|---|---|
| Number of starters | 130 |
| Number of retirements | 58 |
| Retirement percentage | 44.6% |

**Reasons for retirement**

In most cases the prime reason for retirement was clearly stated as a single item. In several isolated instances two reasons were given, and in those cases the information was logged in the proportion judged to suit the individual circumstance.

Almost without exception, credibility of the answering was of an extremely high order, and the disappointed competitors (as most of them obviously were) are to be congratulated on their forthright responses. It was not uncommon to read "... The wind and seas were giving us such a hammering it seemed foolhardy to continue, with two more fronts forecast to follow the first. We thus elected to retire before yacht or crew suffered damage." Another typical answer was"... With one crewman violently seasick and two others bunk-ridden, I felt I did not have sufficient crew to handle such emergencies as the forecasts suggested we might have to face."

One of the most interesting examples of determination but final failure was from a yacht which broke its boom gooseneck fitting in the first blow. This resulted in the complete loss of the mainsail which disintegrated during the subsequent flogging. The yacht diverted inshore into a lee and they made repairs to the boom, and hoisted their spare main. They set off, and on coming out from land's shelter they were hit by a willi-willi which they saw sweep down on them from the cliffs. This completely flattened the boat, first to port and then to starboard in the space of 30 seconds as it passed over. They came up without apparent damage only to discover one crewman was badly concussed. They decided he needed medical attention, so set off to the nearest port. After passing their sick man over to helpers onshore, they headed to sea again. Twelve hours later they had their second mainsail blown out, and then decided to retire!

The following is a statistical breakdown of individual reasons for retirement, quoted as a percentage of starters, and as a percentage of retirers.

(The overall retirement rate was 44.6%.)

| | | % of Fleet | % of Retirers |
|---|---|---|---|
| (a) | Weather too rough | 10.9 | 24.5 |
| (b) | Rigging failure | 10.9 | 24.5 |
| (c) | Hull failure | 8.8 | 19.7 |
| (d) | Seasickness | 7.6 | 17.0 |
| (e) | Sail loss | 2.1 | 4.7 |
| (f) | Battery failure (No communications or nav. lights) | 1.7 | 3.8 |
| (g) | Crew injured | 0.9 | 2.0 |
| (h) | Sundry unclassified reasons | 1.7 | 3.8 |
| | | 44.6 | 100.0 |

To check the retirement rate of different sizes of yachts, we have used the Divisions as established in the Sailing Instructions. They were:

(i) Division A. (54 yachts) Rating 29.6 to 72.6 (Referred to as "all over 1 ton")

(j) Division B. (33 yachts) Rating 26.4 to 28.2 (Referred to as "essentially 1 ton")

(k) Division C. (21 yachts) Rating 23.4 to 26.3 (Referred to as "essentially ¾ ton")

(l) Division D. (23 yachts) Rating 21.5 to 21.7 (Referred to as "½ ton")

(m) All over one ton..... 31% retirement rate

(n) Essentially one ton..... 48% retirement rate

(o) Essentially ¾ ton..... 52% retirement rate

(p) ½ ton..... 39% retirement rate

# HOBART 1977:

Regarding the **type** of yacht amongst the retirements, it is of interest to consider "centreboarders" and "ultra light construction" yachts as identifiable groups (though there is little difference between the two in the cases involved in this race, the six centreboarders being also ultra light construction).

(q) Centreboarders 83% retirement rate

(r) Ultra light construction 86% retirement rate

(The numbers involved here were six and seven respectively, and thus the sample is somewhat small for accurate assessment, though, with only one finisher amongst them, the retirement rate was undeniably high.)

In relation to the ocean racing experience of crew members on board those yachts which retired, we have again resorted to analysing division by division since this will somewhat take into account the differing number of crewmen on the small yachts as against the larger yachts. The only recorded information in the possession of the Club which would give a lead in this respect is the number of previous "Hobart" passages by crewmen. This is by no means the only criteria by which to judge a crewman's ocean experience, and thus the resultant conclusions will need to be treated with reservation.

(s) All over one ton
- (i) Average number of "Hobarts" per yacht over whole Division..... 21.5
- (ii) Average number of "Hobarts" per Retired yacht..... 15.5

(t) Essentially 1 ton
- (i) Average number of "Hobarts" per yacht over whole Division..... 9.7
- (ii) Average number of "Hobarts" per retired yacht..... 8.9

(u) Essentially ¾ ton
- (i) Average number of "Hobarts" per yacht over whole Division..... 9.1
- (ii) Average number of "Hobarts" per retired yacht..... 8.1

(v) ½ ton
- (i) Average number of "Hobarts" per yacht over whole Division..... 4.9
- (ii) Average number of "Hobarts" per retired yacht..... 2.8

**Comments and explanations**

(a) The questionnaire revealed that generally it was not so much the wind strength that caused the retirement but the short steep seas which quickly resulted.

(b) Half of the failures of hull came from only 5% of the fleet. Had the ultra-lightweights not been with us, hull failure would have amounted to 4%. Of the seven in the fleet, 5 retired with hull damage, one called it off on the first night of storm conditions because it was too rough, and the survivor arrived in Hobart with broken hull ribs. This yacht weathered the

conditions by careful nursing during the tough going, but her favourable speed to rating figure enabled her to achieve a creditable seventh overall. Typical amongst the other hull failures were a sprung garboard plank; and stretched keel bolts, both of which were occasioned when falling off seas, and this caused them to take on water at a dangerous rate.

(c) Rigging failure covered the whole gamut. Forestays and shrouds began to strand, backstays carried away, turnbuckles in the standing rigging broke, and halyards failed. There were four cases of the ultimate in rigging failure—dismastings.

(d) Seasickness needs no explanation. When racing yachts are obliged to go to windward in storm conditions the unfortunates who are inclined to mal-der-mer are quickly identified.

(e) Sail loss caused only a small percentage of actual retirements, though much time was spent by many yachts repairing damaged sails during and after the storms.

There were many comments that the sail limitation rule put yachts in jeopardy since they carried too few heavy weather sails. The advent of reefing headsails in two cases caused wiped off lifelines, stanchions, and pulpits, when the resulting "bag" was filled by seas breaking on-board, and their usage was considered dangerous by those who suffered this experience.

(f) and (g) These two categories were insignificantly small and need no explanation.

(h) A typical "odd" reason amongst this unclassified small group was the case of a yacht towing a 15 foot length of kelp for two days through heavy weather with problems of steering brought on by the rubber-like root being jammed in the rudder pintlw. Accordingly, steering to weather through steep seas was very difficult, not to mention the loss of boat speed. They ultimately returned to port so that a man could be put over the side to cut it free. This they found impossible to do in the dark at the time of arrival and caused a wait until daylight. By this stage they had lost so much time they no longer felt competitive and took the decision to retire.

(i) (j) (k) and (l) These paragraphs define the groupings used for statistical purposes and need no additional explanation.

(m) (n) (o) and (p) The retirement rates for the groups of different sized yachts is interesting since it shows an increasing rate as they got smaller, except that the ½ Ton group is the 2nd lowest when it might have been expected to be the highest. In fact, if the visiting three ultra-light constructed ½ Tonners are extracted from the calculations, the retirement rate of the 20 remaining ½ Tonners is only 30%, which is the lowest of the four groups. Similarly, if the four ultra-light constructed One Tonners are removed from the B. Division calculations, their retirement rate drops to 45%, the average of the whole fleet.

(q) and (r) There were six centreboarders in the fleet and seven ultra-light constructed yachts, (the 6 centreboarders being in both groups). All but one of these boats retired, hull damage being the reason in five of the six cases. It was common knowledge that the one survivor, who suffered broken ribs during the passage, had come to an arrangement of sale before the race that required her to get to the finish line. This may have had some bearing on whether she continued or not.

(s) (t) (u) (v) The ocean racing experience of crews is tabulated in these four paragraphs but is compiled from limited information; that of the number of previous "Hobarts" sailed and documented in each yacht's crew list. It does, however, show a pattern which is logical and probably factual. The larger boats have more "experience" on board due to both the larger sized crew and the tendency for experienced men to be attracted to the faster, more comfortable yachts. In each of the four categories of yacht size, the "experience" on board was less amongst the retired portion of the group than the group as a whole, particularly in the cases of Div. A, the largest yachts and Div. D, the smallest yachts. It was not surprising that yachts figuring in top placings in the results carried a very high "experience" count. The biggest total was a staggering 108 previous "Hobarts', and whilst this yacht did not win the race, she started as one of the top favourites and went very close to taking out the first placing. Similarly, the best ½ Tonner, resultwise, had a "Hobart" count amongst her crew which was more than four times the average of her class, and nearly eight times the average of the retired section of her group.

It would probably be fair to say that "experience" on board would have a significantly greater effect in the case of tough race such as this, than a race which was storm free and uneventful.

**Conclusions**

There was heavy pressure on Club administrators which could have caused them to over-react to the high retirement rate in this race, but the Sailing Committee took the stand that no decisions should be taken until a complete study of the reasons for retirement had been conducted.

Taking the reasons for retirement in their order of size, the following conclusions have been drawn by the Sailing Committee.

(i) **Weather too rough**

It is felt quite innappropriate that any action be taken which may reduce the authority of a yacht skipper in taking the decision whether to continue or to retire from a race such as this. He is the sole judge of his ability, that of his crew, and his yacht, and whether to continue racing in the circumstances as he sees or foresees them. It would preferable that a skipper retire rather than continue against his better judgement and then have to call for outside assistance. Search and rescue in the area of this race can be very difficult.

The most that can be advised of skippers intending to make the Sydney-Hobart passage is that they should choose a crew with as much experience as available, race together prior to the actual race as much as possible and so build up confidence in their own ability and that of their crew and yacht, preferably in heavy conditions, before setting forth on Boxing Day. Ocean racing in these waters will always be an adventure and we do not wish, by bureaucratic rules to change this situation. Even the authorities themselves appreciate our attitude in this

respect. Mr H. K. Duncan, Controller of Marine Operations, a branch of the Department of Transport, and the authority in charge of search and rescue, wrote the following after a conference had been held at the Club in early February this year: "... Our responsibility and concern for the safety of life at sea should not be interpreted as a discouragement to yachtsmen whose sense of adventure and spirit of competition is tempered by the reasonable requirements of safety such as are embodied in the A.Y.F. Safety Regulations and your Club Sailing Instructions".

It's refreshing to see that this body has confidence that we and our yachtsmen know how to conduct themselves at sea in terms of safety, and it confirms our wish that skippers themselves exercise caution.

(ii) **Rigging failure**

The questionnaire answers disclosed that this cause for retirement paid no heed to size of boat or category of rigging, and the Sailing Committee feels that more diligent attention on the part of owners and the responsible members of the crew should result in a much lower failure rate than experienced in this race, notwithstanding the conditions encountered. In future it must be appreciated by owners preparing their yachts for the race, that they may face tough conditions literally for days on end, and that any gear which is fatigued from previous racing, or is approaching the end of its safe life, may very probably fail. Forestays, backstays and cap shrouds, together with their adjusting screws, proved very vulnerable in this race, and it may be necessary for the Club to issue a reminder in future Applications for Entry that these items of rigging should receive careful attention before embarkation.

(iii) **Hull failure**

This race signalled the first occasion when 'ultra-light-construction' yachts faced up to a Bass Strait crossing. They proved quite inadequate for storm conditions as evidenced by the fact that whilst they only constituted 5% of the fleet, they occasioned 50% of "hull failures". Their failure rate was 18 times higher than the rest of the fleet! Of the seven entries in this category, only one reached the finishing line, and she suffered structural damage to her hull in the process. A means **has** to be found to adequately identify these yachts so that such a high retirement rate can be avoided in future.

Whilst the I.T.C. and the O.R.C. have made clear their intention to re-rate these types of yachts and so reduce their rating to speed advantage under the present rule, thus arresting the design trend, we have to face up to the safety hazards of those already built and also those which may be constructed notwithstanding the new rules.

Apart from achieving 'equitable racing', which is the obvious goal of the O.R.C., this Club has a clear responsibility to administer a safety screen for yachts wishing to enter a Sydney-Hobart Race. The fact that some yachtsmen need to be protected from their admitted inexperience is shown by the comments in questionnaire answers from "ultra-light construction" owners, that they had "... never experienced seas like these before". It makes one critical of the apparent nursery of this type of yacht, Level Rating, and the lack of heed for the admonishment in the rules for Level Rating Classes "... the boats continue to be developed, designed and constructed to ensure that they remain fit for the open sea" (Rule 6).

The fact that this is not being achieved is attested to when one appreciates that our race was immediately preceded locally by National and World Championships for both Half and One Ton Level Rating Classes, and these were the boats, without exception, which emerged tried and tested from these series. If this is the type of yacht which proves best for Level Racing, then it's time we all recognised that ocean racing, as typified by the Sydney-Hobart Race, is an altogether different league.

(iv) **Seasickness**

This type of retirement cause has afflicted yachtsmen ever since man has ventured into the open sea. It may be reduced as a cause for retirement by skippers being made more aware that a choice of crew less prone to the problem will give them a better chance of finishing such a race, and that preconditioning by sailing in more of the preliminary races would help to both identify the unfortunates and to accustom the others.

(v) **Sail loss**

At 2%, this problem needs little more action than as mentioned earlier under "Comment and explanations" (e), although it does seem strange, for instance, when a world-renowned yacht sets forth without a spare mainsail (as is clearly permitted under the rules), tears the headboard and luff rope completely off their only main, and this becomes one of the prime reasons causing the yacht to become a retirement statistic.

(vi) **Crew experience**

The statistics confirm what is self-evident; a more experienced skipper and crew have a better chance of both surviving the course to a finish and in doing well in the results. Skippers with a low experience on board may well be encouraged to search more diligently to help raise the level of experience before entering.

(vii) **Boat size**

Whilst one would expect storm condition to effect larger yachts less than the small, and in fact the retirement percentage did rise from 31% for the larger yachts; to 48% (or 45% without ultra-lightweights) for one tonners; to 52% for ¾ tonners; the low 30% (without ultra-lightweights) for ½ tonners was the surprise of the statistics.

This leaves no doubt that our fleet of half tonners, whilst not competitive in Level Racing terms, is generally comprised of wholesome rugged ocean racing yachts.

There could be no justification in contemplating elimination of this size of yacht from future Sydney-Hobart Races on the ground of their performance in this race.

GORDON MARSHALL
Chairman, Sailing Committee

**We are indebted to *Seahorse*, the magazine of the Royal Ocean Racing Club, published by Ocean Publications Ltd., 34 Buckingham Palace Road, London SW1WORE, for the following series of articles, which were originally published in *Seahorse* No. 45, March/April 1978.**

**Winter Review**

# Light displacement/ Centreboard controversy

**At the centre is the designer Bruce Farr. Here Alan Sefton interviews him and we make no apologies for publishing his views at length.**

**S:** Are you happy with the style of light displacement dinghy-type boat you are now associated with or have you any thoughts of a change of approach.

**F:** I think as far as the Rule is concerned, I'm happy with what we've got. But I'm very wary of the fact that we are continually compromising the boat for rating, and they are not the best boats for their sizes that we could do.

**S:** Do you mean you could design better all-round boats it it were not for Rule considerations.

**F:** Definitely. If, for instance, we could design a 31-footer without IOR considerations, it would be faster, more stable and probably a nicer boat to sail. The present Half Tonners are real nice boats to sail, but they would be better again if we could get rid of all the speed reducing factors that you have toincorporate to make the boat competitive under IOR.

I feel however that our concept of boats has now developed pretty well within the Rule. It satisfies the requirements of the Rule and as well as being highly competitive, is still a pretty nice boat to sail.

**S:** Your boats have been at the centre of the recent controversy over light-displacement, construction and centreboard. The shots at light displacement and the board seem to be without substance and may be personal predjudice. But what about lightness of construction. Have things gone too far and do we need something like a scantling requirement rule.

**F:** I really believe it would be impossible to reintroduce a scantling rule that would work today.

I also don't think that there have been many boats which have been too lightly built. If developments and improvements in construction and materials continues at their present rate, we will probably see some new boats that will actually be lighter than what we have now and still staying together. We are learning a lot more about hull structures as we go.

Occasionally there will be a failure and the failure is always the critical one because it means that something will be learnt from it. I don't like the idea of failures but I've learnt a lot from them. It's the kind of development we had in 18-footers about 8 or 10 years ago when weight was continually carved out of hulls untila weak area showed up. We then had a limit and that area was beefed up. The development was carried on elsewhere until another weak spot showed up, and so on.

But I don't think it is a good thing that the Rule encourages boats to be lightly built. If there is concern about scantlings—and I feel concern would be justified—the way to fix it would not be with a scantling rule but with a readjustment in the Rule so that there is no realadvantage to carve weight out of boats.

**S:** What adjustments do you suggest.

**F:** The centre of gravity factor is one of those things which, in theory, allows for boats that are professionally built to be built heavily without much ballast. But it doesn't work that way. People will still build a boat light and stick all the weight in the middle. I don't know whether the Rule can actually get around to try and encourage more weight in boats, but I feel that one of the worst areas where boats have been exploited is obviously in the centreboarders—which have only developed because of the rule. I think that is quite definite. Nobody would be into them if the Rule didn't encourage them. And this has meant a lot of thought going into structures because it has become so much more important to get ballast ratios high with most of the weight inside the boat. This is what has put real pressure on the system.

Eighteen months ago we were designing boats which were considered elsewhere in the world to be ridiculously overbuilt. Now we are at the stage where I feel, apart from one area in which we have had problems, where the boats are still slightly excessively built. They could still be lighter but strong enough.

**S:** The area you are talking about is right for'ard—the ring framing.

**F:** Right. We had some failures in the for'ard frames during the One Ton Cup. But all those failures were due to one frame failing. In some cases the damage was more extensive, but it could all be traced back to one initial frame failure. So we had a situation where we realised a limit had been reached. Now we can very confidently design around that limit. We know those boats weren't strong enough in that particular area. But we also know that they only just weren't strong enough. So we can come back X per cent to the safe side of the limit and say 'Right, we know that is okay but we can't go lighter.'

**S:** Does it worry you that this kind of almost trial and error development, which might be all right in 18-footers might mean the loss of a boat or a life in ocean racing.

**F:** That's always a worry, no matter what you are designing, be it light or heavy. And remember there have been plenty of failures amongst the heavy brigade, probably more than we've had in light displacement. But this is something you will never get away from. It has been happening in boats since the year dot.

But today we have boats which are more soundly engineered, particularly in the stress areas. So most of the problems have been eliminated from the engineering point of view. Consequently there is less chance of there being

any real problem.

**S:** You say nobody would be into centreboarders if the rule didn't encourage them. Yet they have proved instantly to be very quick boats and made even your immediately previous designs to be almost obsolete.

**F:** That's true, but I don't think the performance gain was wholly attributable to the board. The centreboard probably has a rating versus performance advantage of about half a foot. That varies of course. Upwind the gain is probably about 0.3ft. Downwind it is something like 0.5ft, or nearer to one foot. But taken all round, the gain is about 0.5ft. But even with those advantages removed, the boats would still be faster and I think a great deal of the improvement in performance has come from other areas—general hull design development and a lot in the rig. Probably also some in better weight concentration.

**S:** Do you agree with the opinion that the conservatives in yachting are trying to legislate your boats off the scene.

**F:** No, I don't think that is the case at all. I personally feel the changes to the rule, which penalize the centreboard, aren't tough enough. There are two areas of gain in the board concept, or were. One was a rating advantage compared with a fixed keel boat. The other a performance advantage in that you can reduce wetted surface by pulling the board up downwind. All the rulemakers have done is remove the rating advantage so that the centreboard is treated the same as a fixed keel. But the performance advantage is still there. I feel this should have been accounted for in the rating. They should penalise a boat with a board, particularly this present style of board boat, which is shallow hulled with a deep board, to a greater extent than a keel boat of the same draft to offset the centreboarder's ability to reduce wetted area. But I think the people controlling the rule were under a lot of pressure from the United States to continue to encourage at least the classic style of centreboard yacht. The Americans like the classic style of shallow draft keel with centreboard in it, and they are keen to encourage it. The rule change does so to a degree and so the Americans will be satisfied. But I don't think anyone else will be.

**S:** Most of the criticism aimed at the board boats hasn't been that they are quicker or have rating advantages. It has been that the boats aren't safe.

**F:** That's right. But you'll find that a lot of that criticism came from people who don't like the style of boat. They can't come right out and say that they are after light-displacement, so they are having a go from the safety viewpoint.

Most of their criticism is misguided and uninformed. These people have a hang-up about the ballast. They figure that if you haven't any ballast in a keel, the boat can't be safe. Or they feel that if a boat has a centreboard it is likely to capsize.

But few, if any of those people have gone out of their way to find out what these boats are all about. They haven't compared the centre of gravity positions with those of modern keel boats. And so we have problems. We've got centreboarders with above minimum CGF, and we've got keel boats with below minimum CGF. So the centre of gravity positions are similar. So are the righting moments. So centreboarders are as safe, probably safer in a lot of respects.

The deep narrow boards do have safety advantages in that, if you do get into a bad knockdown situation, the board will be in a stalling condition because the boat will be going sideways. The drag on the board will be proportional to its area and, because the deep boards have only threequarters the area of conventional keel, they'll slide sideways easier.

There are two reactions involved—the first to the racing machine concept of the centreboarders, the second to the fact that it involves something different. They don't like the fact that these boats look different and, to them, strange.

Some of the criticism is justified—particularly with respect to the way the boats are developing. But again it must be said that the Rule itself has encouraged this line of development. Most of the current light displacement boats have really low centre of gravity factors which means fairly low stability. It has to be that way for this type of boat to be competitive under the Rule. So the Rule encourages low stability, and this is one area of the Rule that needs looking at closely. Nobody willingly designs boats which are low on horsepower, nobody wants to that. The only reason they do so is that there is a performance advantage in it under the Rule as it is now. Regardless of size—and the bullshit they fling about when they talk of smaller yachts and crew weight is just that—there is a definite advantage in reducing stability. You end up with a faster all-round boat because you get more sail, or more length, or whatever.

**I feel that one of the worst areas where boats have been exploited is obviously in the centreboarders—which have only developed because of the rule.**

**Most of the current light displacement boats have really low centre of gravity factors which means fairly low stability. It has to be that way for this type of boat to be competitive under the Rule. So the Rule encourages low stability, and this is one area of the Rule that needs looking at closely.**

**S:** If you, and others in this part of the world, are convinced these boats are safe, why the outcry elsewhere.

**F:** Confusion, and predjudice. I think a lot of people don't like change, particularly change that involves development of racing machines within the rule. They refuse to accept that this is inevitable and won't stop, no matter what they do with the Rule. But it is probably easier for these people to accept development if it looks conventional, even if the boats produced are worse than useless. They feel happier because the boats at least look the way they think they should look.

This is a real problem area. We would love to be designing much more powerful, light displacement boats than we are now. And we could—if the Rule didn't prohibit that. We've already been experimenting in that direction however as we believe a more powerful light displacement boat working within the Rule would make a much better cruiser-racer proposition. We made progress with the Threequarter Tonner last year, sacrificing a bit of length for more beam and a lot more stability. That boat—Joe Louis—worked and that is a direction in which I would like to go. But the Rule doesn't really en-

courage it.

**S:** What about the proposed beam-length formula. How will that affect your boats.

**F:** The ORC, or the ITC have decided that the Rule encourages beam. I think that this is an amazing observation on their part because the Rule has been encouraging beam for at least the last 10 years. It is something which was carried through to the IOR from the RORC rule and it has been there ever since. There is no way a narrow boat, these days, can win a race unless it is downwind all the way.

The rulemakers have belatedly realised that this is the situation and that the Rule does over-encourage beam, so they've come up with a proposal for change. But what they have proposed doesn't seek to discourage beam, it seeks to limit beam and that limit would apply to a greater degree on light displacement boats.

The suggestion is that the restriction on beam should be a proportion of immersed depths. This would mean that in a heavy boat which has a lot of immersed depth, you could have virtually as much beam as you want. But a shallower hulled light-displacement boat would be severely restricted. This is ridiculous. What it really means is that they are taking the opportunity to also have a whack at light displacement, using the beam thing as an excuse.

**S:** Again, why.

**F:** I don't know, to be honest. But there is quite clearly opposition to the light displacement style of yacht within the ITC and ORC. It is hard to gain first hand knowledge of this opposition, but we are aware of it. There are some members of those two bodies who just don't want the boats regardless of whether the Rule is treating them too well or not well enough. My view is that this is a reaction against change from a lot of older people who are pretty set in their ways. Most of those people haven't even been on one of these boats, let alone been for a sail on one. But they see fit to set themselves up on a pedestal and make judgements mainly from information gained third hand or worse. They sit there and say 'These One Tonners are terrible boats. they're unsafe.' Yet none of them have been for a sail on one of those boats. Anyone who has doesn't criticise. They've gone away having found that the newcomers are dryer, have an easier motion, and are a delight to sail. There is a safety hang-up I'm sure, and some of the new centreboarders are borderline. But basically the opposition stems from a dislike of light displacement.

**S:** Where are these boats borderline.

**F:** Some of them are borderline in stability.

**S:** Some of your boats.

**F:** I think some of ours are getting close. But I still think they are on the safe side of the line. One reason we went for drop-keel boats was because we felt that if all the ballast was internal we would be getting too close to the borderline. We put lead in the drop keels to boost stability so that the boats would be safer.

Nobody is smart enough to sit down and say 'That's the limit'. Nobody knows where the limit is or can just look at the boats and say that they are getting too close to the line.

One thing that has happened down here is that the designers who came to the One and Half Ton Cups with centreboarders all strove to be pretty sensible in their approach. We've all increased displacement, actually put weight into the boats to improve stability to the stage where the things are safe. Doug Peterson's B 195 design had a very high ballast ratio with a helluva lot of internal ballast. Whiting, Davidson and myself—we've all taken the safety viewpoint.

We could have gone the other way, done what the French, for example, did in the Threequarter worlds, and gone for the maximum performance from the boats, at the expense of safety, by keeping them very, very light. That would have meant less ballast because you can only build a boat so light. But we didn't.

I feel there has been a need for the ORC to do something about stability, and now they have done so with the computer screen and the the CYCA formula. I think what they have done is probably fairly well right. Most of the boats we know of, that have appeared, in practice, to be safe, do just pass the formula with a bit to spare. There are one or two boats which we have known to be suspect, which don't pass.

The ORC may bave been just a shade conservative, they may need to be a little bit tougher. But at least they have set a good starting point.

The biggest concern in the whole affair was that a lot of people many of them in responsible positions, went off half cocked. They went around making a lot of noise without doing their homework or without knowing all that they should. The outcome, from Australia, was a formula which just wasn't sensible and which didn't fairly treat different boats.

**S:** Do you think the opposition will lessen now after the performance of your boats in the One and Half Ton events and the Southern Cross Cup.

**F:** I would like to think so, but I'm not confident. Some people have made a lot of mileage out of the so-called lack of safety of these boats. I think they've been proved wrong. But just how effectively we can combat what they have stirred up, I'm not sure. To pursue the thing through official channels would take too long. The year would be up and we'd have got nowhere. The best we can hope for is good press coverage, hopefully fair and accurate press coverage.

**S:** The Half Ton series was dominated by centreboarders, but also by two designers, yourself with a light displacement approach and Ron Holland with what was virtually a heavy displacement boat. Does this indicate that the Rule is working despite the criticism that has been fired at it likely.

**F:** I think so. Without *Silver Shamrock* in the Half Ton fleet, the anti light-displacement brigade would have had a whole lot more ammunition to say

**My view is that this is a reaction against change from a lot of older people who are pretty set in their ways. Most of those people haven't even been on one of these boats, let alone been for a sail on one.**

**They sit there and say 'These One Tonners are terrible boats, they're unsafe.' Yet none of them have been for a sail on one of those boats. Anyone who has doesn't criticise. They've gone away having found that the newcomers are dryer, have an easier motion, and are a delight to sail.**

that the Rule favours that type of boat. But Holland, with *Shamrock*, proved convincingly that you can take a moderate to heavy displacement boat—probably still moderate but about as heavy as people want to go these days—and still be completely competitive under the Rule.

It was an interesting situation. The two styles of boat presented—say *Gunboat Rangiriri* from us and Silver *Shamrock* from Holland—were probably developed to a very similar stage. Both styles of boat were sailed by very good people; there was little between them in ability. Both styles of boat were rigged to a similar standard—*Shamrock* probably had more rig adjustment capability, our boat probably had more built-in rig adjustability. So one was a highly developed tune-as-you-go rig, the other a highly developed semi-automatic rig. In the hulls, we used some pretty sophisticated Kevlar-glass lay-ups which were light but strong. *Shamrock* used a timber-carbon fibre combination. There probably wasn't much to choose between them.

a better type of boat. . . but whether or not that means they are faster on IOR rating results?

I do know that they are easier to sail, they are more fun to sail, they are cheaper to build and equip and they have more room potential. All-round, they are probably a better style of boat than what the Rule has given us as the norm. People in New Zealand haven't spent 50 years developing this style of boat because they are worse than anything else.

This, I think, is part of the problem we face. People in the Northern hemisphere look at this style of boat and think it has gone off on a tangent from the norm. They want to correct it by bringing it back to the Rule norm. But what they don't realise is that that isn't the case at all. The light displacement boats now ocean racing came from an approach that was already highly developed along the light displacement theme before it got anywhere near a Rule. It certainly didn't develop because of the Rule. All we are doing is adapting that already developed ing speed. They had limited budgets—probably more limited than anywhere else in the world, they wanted X amount of room and they wanted as much out of that room for the number of dollars they had. The light displacement theme of boat is what developed out of all that.

New Zealand wasn't the only place doing this either. The States used to be full of nice, moderate displacement centreboard yachts and that sort of thing.

England had a lot of narrowish, reasonably light and long yachts. What happened to them?

If you go back 20 years, people weren't sailing around in boats like the One Tonners that developed because of the Rule four years ago, boats that were forced to the stage that they pushed half the ocean with them downwind and needed half the crew to hang on to the tiller.

The RORC, and then the IOR, came along and encouraged the trend towards lots of beam, lots of weight and bloody big foretriangle rigs. Now these things are being shoved at us and regarded as the 'norm'.

The exploitation of beam started gathering speed about 15 years ago, ever since people began to realise that if you put X amount more beam on a boat the thing didn't go enough slower to cancel out the extra earned. So under the Rule, you had a better boat.

The only way to check this development is to reduce the loading of beam in the rating formula. But don't put a limit on it. If they do that—as they are proposing—all that will happen is everyone will design to that limit. Then you won't have a rating rule situation, you'll have a fixed dimension.

**The light displacement boat developed in New Zealand because, for a long time, we didn't have any Rule to consider. People set out to design nice fast cruising yachts with the only performance requirement being speed. They had limited budgets—probably more limited than anywhere else in the world, they wanted X amount of room and they wanted as much out of that room for the number of dollars they had. The light displacement theme of boat is what developed out of all that.**

So we had two entirely different boat types developed to a similar pitch and they were very similar in performance, and similar over a wide range of conditions. Through most conditions they were almost identical in boat speed. *Shamrock* was faster downwind in the light, our boats were faster downwind in the fresh. Between those extremes they were so similar they really could have been the same design.

It was the old trade-off situation. We were giving away downwind light for downwind heavy, Holland did the opposite. That choice will still be there regardless of whether they kick light displacement boats out. Someone will still design heavier displacement boats which, compared with *Shamrock*, will be faster in the heavy and slower in the light. That's just a design option.

So I feel the Half Ton did prove that the Rule is at least coping.

**S:** What do you really feel about light displacement.

**F:** I'm convinced that they are probably

light-displacement theme to the Rule, and the Rule is supposed to equitably handicap boats of all different styles. The Americans have come up with graphs which supposedly prove a change and trend towards higher sail area-displacement ratios and lower displacement-length ratios. In other words, they are suggesting a trend towards lighter displacement boats with more sail for their size and they feel this trend should be checked.

Why?

Is there anything wrong with boats being lighter for their size? That is probably the result of better technology if nothing else. Boats can be built lighter these days, but still as powerful because of construction developments. That has got to be a good thing.

The light displacement boat developed in New Zealand because, for a long time, we didn't have any Rule to consider. People set out to design nice fast cruising yachts with the only performance requirement be-

**Reprinted from *Seahorse* No. 45 March/April 1978**

**Winter Review**

# Light displacement/ Centreboard controversy

**. . .and here Sefton interviews Ron Holland.**

**S:** What is your attitude to the light displacement and centreboard controversy.

**H:** To make an assessment on anything, you first have to find out what is happening. This is one reason why I invest a lot of time and effort in racing on my boats. You can't sit behind a desk and just hear what is going on with any accuracy—every guy has his own story as to why he won or lost. And that has to be related to these very light boats. If you're sitting in London at the RORC, how do you actually know what is going on in some other part of the world. Even if you're sitting ashore as a race officer during one of these big series, how do you really know what is happening out there on the water.

You must have the feed-back, and there is nothing like first hand information.

This is why there is so much uncertainty with light boats and what has developed in New Zealand and Australia in recent months.

The people in Europe and North America have no real knowledge of them.

However, the feeling is that there is the real possibility that these new boats are too extreme—and I'm pretty well in total agreement with that. If a boat can capsize, whether it comes back or not makes no difference. If the boats are becoming of such a design shape and of low enough stability that they do tip over in extreme conditions more readily than a conventional boat, then one has to question the ultimate safety of the sport.

If you are racing the Transatlantic in a boat that is the ultimate in a racing boat, needs to be light and a low stability sort of boat, and you capsize and have guys in the water on their lifelines for whatever time—that's extreme. It may not matter in Sydney Harbour, or perhaps it matters less in the Hauraki Gulf. But it sure as hell matters in the North Sea or the English Channel.

I feel strongly that if we are developing an international rule for ocean racing, there has to be some international agreeement on what the rules of the games are to be.

That means asking the question: 'Do we really want to go to sea in boats that are big dinghies.'

I don't want to design boats that are lead mines. I want to be into the development designs too. But the general feeling is that these newcomers are becoming scary and almost as dangerous as formula one racing cars would be in relation to saloon cars. If that is the case then the whole of the yacht design business, from our point of view, won't be much fun because there will hardly be anyone left doing the sport.

**S:** Are you talking primarily about the new centreboarders, or about light displacement boats in general.

**H.** I'm talking about boats which have the design philosphy behind them which makes them difficult to sail, like ocean going dinghies, and which have the possibility of tipping over.

Keel boats will tip over too. You run them down a wave and pitch-pole them, they'll fill up with water and sink. But that would be an extreme. You get a fleet of these radical boats in the hands of anyone but the very best guys, guys who understand all the criteria surrounding the handling and performance of those boats, then sure as hell people will tip them over. And sure as hell guys are going to break their lifelines and be lost.

As long as boats are in the hands of people who understand them, there's a reasonably good chance that nobody will get hurt. But what happens when these boats are sold, or what happens when people in another country, who the designer can't assess, order and build these boats. Then I think, the situation will become dangerous.

It's like letting a guy, say from South Africa, buy himself a formula one racing car to play with on his farmyard circuit. He's probably going to kill himself. Those are my feelings on why people should be worried about what is developing. If they are concerned just because these boats are different, then that is not a fair reason for being so.

**S:** Some of what you have said applies also to modern keel boats. If you've got a crew that can't handle a heavy displacement type boat downwind in fresh conditions, the danger could be just as real.

**H:** Yes, except that they would probably blow the rig out of the boat long before anything more serious had a chance to happen.

It's a really scary scene. I can only go on second hand knowledge in this one, but the *B195* guys told me they watched the *Smir-Noff-Agen* crew try a kite in 40 to 50 knots at Channel Island in the One Ton ocean race. The Aussies just sat there and laughed. *Smir-Noff-Agen* went completely out of control, the boat went over and stayed on its side for a long time. Yet those guys on *Smir-Noff-Agen* are really talented sailors and should have understood the significance of what they were doing. If those guys can't survive, what chance has the average guy got. And that means 99 per cent of the people who sail in the Admiral's Cup.

**Do we really want to go to sea in boats that are big dinghies.**

If you analyse the relationship between centre of gravity and the beam of a boat, there is the possibility that these boats will go over and balance on their wide beam and relative centre of gravity position. Then there's the problem of what happens if they go all

**. . . the general feeling is that these newcomers are becoming scary and almost as dangerous as formula one racing cars would be in relation to saloon cars. If that is the case then the whole of the yacht design business, from our point of view, won't be much fun because there will hardly be anyone left doing the sport.**

the way over. They could stay upside down. I hadn't considered that, but I've been told here that guys have seen Tempests upside down and balanced in that position for a long time until the crew has grabbed the keel and managed to pull them back up again. I wouldn't have believed that, yet Tempests would have a lower centre of gravity relative, and a narrower beam relative, than these new centreboard ocean racers.

The real problem facing the Rulemakers is how to deal with them without penalising them beyond fairness. This brings us back to the rules of the game. These must be better defined. If it is felt that the boats we are getting now are dangerous for whatever reasons, the rule should be orientated to bring them back into line. If it is felt there is a danger of these boats tipping over then a minimum CGF must be introduced that makes sure a boat will come back again even if it does tip.

To me these boats are really exciting, they have a brillinat standard of performance in certain conditions, a standard that is way beyond that of boats to a heavier design philosophy. That's exciting. But it doesn't alter the fact that, internationally, it is difficult to sell the idea. The argument that they are cheap to build has also gone out of the window because to build them light enough but strong enough they have to be pretty sophisticated. In a way, I suppose, there is a case for a special development division in which you can do anything you like, go out there with any concept of boat you like and take your chances. That would be fun to do, and it would be interesting to see what design developments it encouraged.

**S:** Do you feel the Rule is coping with what is going on.

**H:** It isn't coping. It's failing because, at the moment, there is no way to control the structural integrity of the boats or their seaworthiness. In my opinion, light boats are more seaworthy than heavy boats. But we're pushing the hell out of the structural integrity of the boats at the same time.

We're getting into a sort of Future Shock type situation where, together, light displacement and really light construction are dangerous if you take them to the logical extreme.

**S:** You feel then the light displacement approach must be brought back into line.

**H:** They want to make a rule to try and assess how strong the boats are, or make a limit on how weak you can make them. I don't know how you do that. There are now so many different ways to build boats. There have been really positive gains in the stability of structures such as we did in *Imp*, plus ways of saving weight without sacrificing strength by using new glass materials incorporating more carbon fibre and even more sophisticated space framing.

Nobody in the world could say *Imp* isn't strong enough. She's been across the Atlantic without even cracking the paint.

So, from where I'm sitting, I feel a little pissed off at these guys building weak boats that are breaking. It's spoiling my game. My boats are built in a different way, if you like, and they are getting labelled with other boats that are breaking. Yet we know damned well that our safety factors are really pretty conservative.

**S.** You have said that the next development from centreboards could be a combination of centreboards and bilge boards.

**H:** I think the concept of varying the apendage under the boat for different conditions is completely valid. The centreboard is just one stop in that direction. Ideally, to get the maximum performance out of these boats, you would vary the keel and rudder shapes to suit different conditions. The condition for going to windward bears no resemblance whatsoever to what is needed for downwind sailing. They are two completely different problems.

But you are dealing all the time with the Rule and you have to play the Rule.

Under the Rule, the moveable appendage factor makes it really tough to experiment with this area. If one form of design, using a centreboard or whatever, proves it has a positive advantage, it is the rulemakers' job to bring that design back into line with the rest of the fleet so as to protect the value of existing boats.

Which is basically what the whole Rule amounts to—it is almost more than performance equality. They have to maintain the financial value of boats already in existence, protect owners' financial investment if you like. So, if anyone comes up with something that is obviously better, the rulemakers feel it their duty to bring in a penalty to make any development equate with whatever is the norm.

**I personally feel the changes to the rule, which penalise the centreboard, aren't tough enough.**

**S.** Why, then, wasn't this done after *Resolute Salmon* showed there was a centreboard loophole with her win in Marseilles in 1976.

**H:** Precisely. Everyone, so we thought, saw the loophole and expected something to be done. But nothing was done and now, under the existing way of measuring ocean racing yachts, you have to have a centreboard or you can forget it. In my opinion it is still possible to make centreboards work despite the draft factor that has been introduced. You still have the advantage of being able to pull the board up downwind in the light.

But at least the centreboard affair showed that the rulemakers are trying. They didn't jump overboard to stamp on something, and I think, in a way, that's good.

**However, the feeling is that there is the real possibility that these new boats are too extreme—and I'm pretty well in total agreement with that. If a boat can capsize, whether it comes back or not makes no difference.**

**Reprinted from *Seahorse* No. 45 March/April 1978**

# Southern Cross and Sydney-Hobart

**The Brit's view by John Coote, aboard *Knockout* for the series.**

On the face of it the British team's third place in the Southern Cross series fell short of the high hopes held out for it by the RORC, the sponsors and the crews. In any series open to boats ranging from Half-Tonners to Maxi-raters, all eyes were on the team to beat, New Zealand's trio of Farr centreboarders. Our Two-Tonners (*Knockout* and *Winsome 77*) has to concede four feet of rating to *Jenny H* and *Smir-Noff-Agen)* and no less than 10 feet to the slippery little Half-Tonner *Swuzzlebubble*. But we counted on our own Half-Tonner *Xaviera* matching her.

In the event, the nearest we got to winning was in the Committee Room of the CYCA before the race, when they threatened to refuse the entries of unballasted centreboarders. The Australian national authority persuaded the organisers not to carry out their 90-degree inclination test on boats which had satisfied the ORC's computer analysis. The threat posed by ultra-light centreboarders with three-quarter rigs was forcibly demonstrated by the manner in which these dinghies with lids on, Soling masts and piano-wire rigging swept the board in the World Half-Ton Championships in Sydney a few days before the start of the Southern Cross series.

In the first three races—two 30 mile Olympic courses and one 180-mile coastal race—New Zealand duly took 1st and 2nd place in all three of them; whilst their lowest placing was a 9th by *Swuzzlebubble* in the opener, significantly, there was up to 35 knots of wind. This event was marked by a spectacular 12-knot prang at the leeward mark when *Windward Passage* punched a yawning hole in Kialoa's quarter and returned to harbour with her tubular steel bowsprit platform cocked vertically. Our team also suffered a setback when *Xaviera* was towed home without a rudder.

The excellent yard at the CYCA had Xaviera back in business in time for the offshore race next morning, when she scored a respectable 9th, which with *Knockout's* 7th and *Winsome's* 10th lifted the British team into second place, where it stayed until the start of the Hobart Race. With triple points to count on the big one, even the New Zealand lead of 80 points was not invulnerable—with a little help from the weather.

The noon start on Boxing Day is one of Sport's great spectacles. It seemed that everything that floated in Sydney Harbour, from Hobie cats to overcrowded, fully-licenced ferryboats, jammed the severely-policed touchlines. But, unlike the Cowes-Torquay Powerboat Race, the spectator fleet, which outnumbered the record 131 starters by over ten to one, had no difficulty keeping up with the race all the way out to the Heads. At this point the race-boats came on wind and traffic control broke down. Many, *Knockout* amongst them, got becalmed in a nasty slop of powerboat wakes over the ever-present Pacific swell. Here the 72 ft. Helsal became the first to retire, having been holed by a ferry.

There was nothing in the weather forecasts or in the quiet sail through a moonlit night with porpoises cavorting all around to suggest that *Helsal* was to be joined by nearly half the fleet. By the early hours the wind had backed to the NW, slowly dying during a brilliant forenoon of exceptional heat and visibility. Off Montagu Island with 100 miles to go to the Bass Strait, a long bank of billowy white cumulus loomed over the horizon ahead. But for the picture in the Australian Pilot, you could be forgiven for thinking it presaged good weather and not the classic sign of a southerly buster. We had less than three minutes to get the blooper and the half-ounce spinnaker off, put all three slabs in the main and set the No. 6 genoa before we were close-hauled on starboard in a 40 knot gale.

All the pundits, including our local crew members, agreed that it would blow itself out in a few hours and then swing around, probably to the nor-west. The radio spoke of WSW or W'ly winds at 20-30 kts, so it seemed fair enough to hold on our SE'ly course, even though we were getting a long way east of rhumb line. Three hours later we were recording a steady 50 knots. At this point an ugly comber broker clean over the boat, ripping our genoa at its clew and wiping out two leeward stanchions with the weight of water in the loose foot of the deeply reefed headsail. Later we learnt that Superstar suffered an identical casualty. But she lost her pulpit as well, so was forced to retire.

Now under storm jib, set flying but for terylene lacing holding the luff to the headstay, we were pointing lower than ever through 20-foot seas. The anemometer flickered around 57 knots and then stuck on 60. In the middle watch another big sea swept over the boat and pulled the jibhead away from its luff-wire, which meant sailing bare-headed for nearly an hour whilst it was cobbled together again.

After 24 hours of waiting in vain for the forecast windshift, we tacked to the west to get back on track. The post-mortem of the race showed that we need never have made this four-hour tack or should have put it in whilst still under the lee of the mainland, which many of the ultimate winners did. Then we received our first strong wind warning (30 kts SE'ly). That breeze came briefly on the morning of the fourth day,only to herald the onset of 48 hours of fickle winds and agonising progress under ghosters, floaters and bloopers. The surviving big boats were far enough ahead to avoid the worst of this calm, so *Kialoa* once again took line honours and saved her time overall, with *Ragmuffin* and *Windward Passage* taking 2nd and 3rd places, to everyone's delight.

Meanwhile back at Tasman Island at first light on New Year's Eve we fell into the notorious hole off Cape Raoul for three hours, whilst half a dozen boats we'd left for dead the previous evening sailed by. Storm Bay and the Derwent provided their usual fustra-

tions, before the welcome at Constitution Dock made it all seem worthwhile. We soon found that all but one of the centreboarders had retired, but she was the redoubtable *Jenny H* who came fifth—a fine consolation for the near-fatal structural damage which forced her retirement from the World One-Ton Championships. It also ensured the Southern Cross Cup going to New Zealand. In spite of *Winsome 77* putting up her best performance of the series (9th), our team could not carry another nil return from *Xaviera*. Of the 73 starters under 38 ft. LOA, 38 had to turn back, whilst a third of the 56 larger boats never reached Hobart.

A study of how the various designers' boats fared is not particularly instructive. With one notable exception, those which had the most failures in the race also designed some of the top-scoring boats in the series. No one would have believed it possible before the Hobart Race, but six of the eight top-scoring boats were Two-Tonners, headed by *Pinta*(2nd) and *Knockout* (4th). Peterson Holland and Farr each had two boats in the top eight.

Joe Diamond, Commodore of the CYCA and responsible for the impeccable race organisation behind the whole series, called a skipper's meeting to discuss the toll which the gale had taken. Of the 57 known to have reached mainland ports, only 15 had notified the Race Committee of the cause of their retirement. Three had been dismasted, five had rigging failures, there were several horrifying tales, of hull damage (mostly encoded as 'hitting uknown objects') and a few boats reported their sail inventories wiped out, but a suspicion hung over the room that crew failure probably played a major role. Whilst it was generally accepted that the light construction trend had gone too far, one NZ skipper insisted that the lessons of the race would not be lost on designers in his country and that they could, and would, henceforth build hulls, especially their foreward sections, which would take whatever the weather dished out. But no one contested the view that an unballasted centreboarder which took a knockdown putting spars and sails underwater would probably not be self-righting.

So the skippers voted unanimously in favour of the reintroduction of scantling penalties for hulls and masts, a closer scrutiny of crews' experience, the abolition of reefed headsails and thus any limitation on their numbers and a mandatory post-race analysis of any boat's reason for failing to complete an offshore race. They also want designers and builders to issue certificates confirming each new boat's safety and seaworthiness. Above all, they emphasised all Race Committees' responsibility to use their absolute discretion in refusing suspect entries, always basing their decision on the assumption that ultimate weather may be encountered in each and every race—and not once in a while. The local Club might have been faced with this dilemma right away for the Trans-Tasman Race, but all bar one of the entries cried off.

The British team's challenge for the Cup was widely accepted Down Under as returning the compliment for the Australians' having sent a team over for the Silver Jubilee Year Admiral's Cup. Certainly it provoked much discussion about them having another go in 1979, but the escalating costs of mounting such a campaign 12,000 miles from home is as daunting to them as it was to us. Our venture was only made possible by many generous sponsors, notably Overseas Containers Ltd., Hitachi, Lloyds Bank International, The Rank Organisation, Singapore Airlines and Wm. Teacher and Sons.

A new look at Rule 26 may be needed if we are going to see this sort of international racing flourish. As it was, *Knockout* was threatened with disqualification if she left the dock at Rushcutters Bay with one of her crew still wearing a tee-shirt depicting Bombardier Billy Wells striking a gong, which was spotted on him as he was carrying the ice on board.

# Compass introduces
# THE NEW IMPROVED 28



MODERN EFFICIENT SLAB REEFING, EXTRA WINCHES AND BOOM COVER

LONGER MORE SPACIOUS COCKPIT

REDESIGNED ANCHOR AND CHAIN LOCKER IN BOW SECTION GIVES MORE ACCOMMODATION IN THE FORWARD CABIN

SPECIAL NEW VENTILATING HATCH ON TRUNK CABIN GIVES MORE LIGHT AND BETTER AIR FLOW TO THE MAIN SALOON

NEW SERIES YANMAR DIESEL WITH LONG RANGE FUEL TANKS.

Perhaps one of Australia's most successful production yachts, the Compass 28 continues to prove as popular as ever with now nearly 400 C28's throughout Australia and the S.W. Pacific.

The well-proven, good all-purpose design, quality finish and sheer value for money, make it hard to ignore the Compass 28 when seeking a new yacht. It is large enough for comfortable ocean cruising yet just the right size for family day sailing. It is easy to handle, seakindly, well balanced and fast enough to enjoy a Saturday afternoon race.

The well-planned interior with headliner throughout will sleep 6 adults in the good 6' sized berths, and all fittings and accessories are well located for maximum space usage.


**Compass Yachts** (AUSTRALASIA) PTY. LTD.

4 Production Ave., Kogarah, N.S.W. 2217. Ph. (02) 587 8672

Please rush me more information on the New Compass 28.

NAME .....

ADDRESS .....

POSTCODE .....

GWA 1850

# North Sails announce.....

## Special North's service to yacht owners at the C.Y.C.A.

* North Sails' repair locker is now operating for the repair and service of ALL makes of sails. Just fill in the card and your sails will be picked up on Monday and returned on Friday.
* Call our experts to come aboard your yacht and advise you on rating improvements and sailing performance.

**NORTH SAILS**

879 BARRENJOEY ROAD,
PALM BEACH, 2108. PHONE: 919 4044.

AUSTRALIAN SAILMAKING INDUSTRIES GROUP MEMBER

GWA1865

# BIGGLES' COLUMN

**(by John Brooks)**

---

The Editor,
*Offshore*

Dear Sir,

Reference: *Mercedes V*

I would like to draw your attention to "Biggles Column" (by John Brooks) on page 29 in the February—March issue, No. 40, of *Offshore.*

A reference was made to the number of retirements from the 1977 Sydney—Hobart Race caused by seasickness and carries on to state as follows:—

"That a N.S.W. team representative should retire because of it is something less than disgraceful."

*Mercedes V* was the only N.S.W. team representative to retire so the article obviously means that my decision to retire was "something less than disgraceful".

The fact is that *Mercedes V* was forced to retire after the second main halyard had been broken which left it without a main. Seasickness was not at any time a reason for retirement.

I am advised that the article is clearly defamatory and request that you publish prominently in your next issue the truth concerning the retirement of *Mercedes V.*

Yours faithfully,
H. Jones
Skipper.

---

Congratulations to Neville Gosson and his *Leda* crew who after eating *Apollo's* dust for so long, got it all together in the Sydney-Brisbane Race and took line honours from *Apollo* and the speedster *Casablanca,* which led for most of the race; it was a very popular result. Congratulations also to *Diamond Cutter,* which won the race overall with a little assistance from age allowance and a lot from a skipper and crew who, from all accounts, drove the 1-tonner unmercifully throughout the race.

Commiserations to the Hankin brothers, owners of the two new glamour boats on the N.S.W. scene: *Deception* (David Hankin) lost her mast just south of Seal Rocks; *Relentless* (Peter Hankin) survived until Cape Byron, when the ill-advised trimming of the hydraulic boom vang put a kink in the mast near the gooseneck—when she appeared to have the race wrapped up on handicap. *Relentless* completed the last 100 miles of the race, with much reduced sail and some interesting-looking jury rigging, to take second place, overall, which would be some consolation.

* * *

The Poor Bloody Owner. Over the last three years or so several of our more active racing owners have invested six-figure sums in new first-rate ocean racers, and more have come close to six figures building level rating boats. Without exception any boat launched earlier than late last year is now obsolete in terms of international competition, and, when faced with light-displacement centreboarders or fixed keel versions of them, are also completely out-classed in local waters.

The effect of this I observed at first hand serving on Peter Hankin's new Peterson 1 Tonner in the Sydney-Brisbane Race. *Relentless,* sailing in her first race, spent almost a day finding her feet, then started yapping at the heels of much higher rating boats including a former Admiral's Cupper, a recent Farr 2-Tonner, and the 54' *Willi Willi,* which she eventually beat across the line. *Relentless'* charge was slowed when she bent her mast but not before she had served notice that a lot of expensive machinery can now be considered obsolete in the I.O.R. sense. The question is how long before *Relentless* also suffers the same fate?

Now I find this very ominous, because no P.B.O. in his right mind is going to build an expensive I.O.R. boat while the rule permits this farcical rate of obsolescence to continue. One can but hope that there are enough of them around who are *not* in their right minds for new boats to keep coming. Already we have a proposal that our next Admiral's Cup boats be built and campaigned in the U.K., then sold immediately after the series. That would effectively wipe out any flow-on of experience or technology as well as choking off regular injections of new blood to the local scene.

Even what appeared to many as 'sensational' decisions by the O.R.C. Technical Committee to try and halt or slow the trend to ultra-light centre-boarders appear somewhat lukewarm now that the dust has settled and some rational analysis of the effects of the rule changes has been made. In no significant way have those changes pointed us back towards the cruiser-racer, which may be an obsolete concept in itself, or slowed the totally counterproductive race to obsolence.

What makes it even worse is that the O.R.C. is firmly committed to a policy of rule changes over the next few years, some of which have already been written and others about which only the intent is known. All of which makes it impossible for potential owner/skippers or, for that matter, designers to even hazard an educated guess as to which style of hull or rig has any chance of surviving as a competitive force for more than one season or two at most.

Where does that leave the P.B.O.? I suggest that it leaves him with the cap firmly on his pen and his cheque book hidden in an inside pocket, and that is when we all begin to hurt a little. It would be a brave designer indeed who claims to have the answers, but no doubt there will be those who will do so when confronted by eager buyers with cheque book in hand and that gleam in the eyes. I don't think there will be too many of those around here for quite a while, and it could be argued that in that state of affairs lies the demise of Australia as a force on the international racing scene.

To suggest that our I.O.R. committees have not served us well, as has been said overseas, ignores the fact that we have walked hand in hand with them every step of the way and are continuing to do so in the face of policy and rule changes which are clearly too little and too late. The stated policy of the O.R.C. is to lead us back to the cruiser-racer

concept, but one wonders just how long is this going to take and just what is the Council's concept of the cruiser-racer?

For myself I have settled down with a very comfortable little cruising yacht on which the word racer is regarded as a dirty word, and nothing would make me consider building another racing boat, except perhaps the establishment locally of a one-design ocean racer of modest size and rigid class limitations. After all, Level Rating had its genesis in dissatisfaciton with handicapping; so too might one design develop from dissatisfaction with I.O.R. design obsolence. Whatever the answer is, it can't come soon enough if we are to keep the P.B.O's interested, and that is very much the name of the game.




The Ninth Edition of *Sailing Directions—New South Wales Coast* has been out for about nine months, but some readers may not have seen this most recent version of what is a most useful aid to navigation.

The Ninth Edition is the most complete revision yet done to the *Sailing Directions—New South Wales Coast;* changes include metrication, adoption of place names assigned by the Geographical Names Board, and the inclusion of a large number of oblique aerial photographs of important harbour and river entrances along the N.S.W. coast. The book is published by the Maritime Services Board.

Not all of the history of the *Sailing Directions* is well-known; in fact, efforts to trace a copy of the First Edition have been unsuccessful. The Second Edition (in 1920) and the Third Edition (1930) were "Issued by the Department of Navigation, Sydney under the authority of the Colonial Treasurer." The Second Edition clearly draws heavily on the *Australian Directory,* a comprehensive guide to navigation of which directions for the N.S.W. coast are only a small part. The *Australia Directory* went through several Editions, and the following quote from the "Advertisement to the Third Edition" of that work gives clues to the evolution of the *Sailing Directions.*

"The first edition of this work was compiled by Commander C.B. Yule in 1859, chiefly from the records of the several explorations and surveys undertaken by the British Government, beginning with that conducted by Cook (the discoverer of the East Coast) in the year 1770, followed in 1799-1803 by Flinders. With those explorations were embodied the labours of Captains P.P. King, Blackwood, Owen Stanley, Stokes, Denham, Commander Wickham and Lieutenant Yule, Royal Navy, extending from 1819 to 1858."

Even recent editions of the *Sailing Directions* have contained remnants of the quaint phraseology typical of the *Australia Directory.*

The Second Edition (1920) tells us that, on the shore of Nelson Bay, was a small settlement with a hotel and a post and telegraph office, also a pier from which a small steamer ran daily to Newcastle. Kiama, 73 miles by rail from Sydney, had a population of about 1600 persons, telegraph and telephone, also daily mail to and from Sydney. East Boyd, Twofold Bay, had a few houses and was connected to Eden by telephone, mail to Sydney twice weekly, drinking water unobtainable. Eden itself was described as a growing town, with full postal facilities and long distance telephone to Sydney and Melbourne. Population in 1918 was 240 persons. Nimitybelle, (as Nimitabel was then known) 100 miles away, was the terminus of the Southern Railway, to which there was a daily motor-car service (Sundays excepted) via Bega. The Illawarra steamer called weekly. Port Macquarie had a population of 1268 persons in 1918. A daily train (Sundays excepted) ran from Wauchope, 12 miles distant, to Sydney, and a motor-car service met all trains.

On a cautionary note, some earlier editions recounted the case of the errant apprentice lad, who "during his employer's absence, opened an old socket signal, obtained from a local steamship, and heaped the contents on the workbench. This charge was a few minutes later exploded by a flash from a shot-gun cartridge which he was manipulating in the vyce, with the result that the workshop was partially wrecked, the sides and windows being blown out, and the boy injured on the face and body".

Nautical people within the Maritime Services Board were concerned that, as recently as the Eighth Edition of 1969, reference was made to a vessel "clawing off the land" and that the intrepid mariner was still being urged to regularly heave the log, and to sound, using a hand lead line.

The *Sailing Directions* contains a tremendous amount of detailed information. The vestiges of its past and its encyclopaedic nature make it heavy reading—not a quick-and-easy cockpit reference, for example, when you're navigating a narrow, unfamiliar entrance at night and you haven't done enough homework beforehand. If you're in hurry for information, you might well find yourself aground before you are able to extract the particular detail you're looking for in the *Sailing Directions*—it's all there, but not in a pre-digested, rapidly assimilable form.

The new oblique aerial photographs of harbour entrances are a very useful addition, although it's a pity the book does not also contain sea level photographs, from which you could discern the profile of the entrances—especially helpful on a moonless night, and a point of view not always given on your charts. The *Sailing Directions* do contain a lot of information not on your chart, such as bridge heights and opening times, telephone numbers, radio facilities, etc., etc., etc.

Available from the Licensing and Certification Branch of the Maritime Services Board, 132 George St., Sydney (also Newcastle and Port Kembla Offices) the *Sailing Directions—New South Wales Coast,* at $7.00 (plus $1 for handling and postage if applicable) is a steal and a must for every yacht's bookshelf.

# Watson's Knaviguessing Know-how

The other week, we had a total eclipse of the moon. I saw the tail end of it, as I went about my chores. It occurred to me then that a simple question would throw some light upon the level of comprehension existing in my current celestial class.

So, at our next session, I asked the question, and was met by about 90% of blank looks and shaking heads. This was the question:

In astronomical terms, what relationship must exist between the sun and moon in order that a total eclipse of the moon will occur? Have a think about that; I'll give the answer later on.

My confidence in my teaching ability having been sorely shattered, we spent that session in defining the areas of weakness in the class and discovered that the main weakness was lack of understanding of the terms used in celestial navigation (and by this stage we were taking sights). It is most important, in my opinion, that the principles be understood, as silly mistakes are then avoided. We cannot always avoid the arithmetical mistake, but wrong names in hour angle and azimuth can create havoc, sometimes without our realising it.

**DEFINITIONS**

| | |
|---|---|
| NESW | = PLANE OF RATIONAL HORIZON |
| Z | = OBSERVER'S ZENITH |
| X | = THE BODY |
| WQE | = CELESTIAL EQUATOR |
| WZE | = GREAT CIRCLE THRU ZENITH |
| NZS | = OBSERVER'S MERIDIAN |
| QZ | = LATITUDE |
| Q'X | = DECLINATION |
| AX | = ALTITUDE |
| ZX | = ZENITH DISTANCE |
| QZX | = AZIMUTH |
| ZPX | = LOCAL HOUR ANGLE |
| P | = POLE |
| PZ | = POLAR DISTANCE |

During the learning process, I insist that each sight be illustrated by a quick sketch on the plane of the rational horizon, with all the parts of the celestial triangle being shown nearly to scale. This is a great help in understanding just what we are trying to achieve. Let's say that we have arrived at a situation where our HA = 322°, declination = 15° north, latitude = 25° south. How does that look in a picture? Have a look at figure 1:

Fig. 1




We must remember that we are looking down upon a hemisphere, not a flat disc. Let's say we rotate it so that we are looking down at the eastern point of the horizon, and at the observer's meridan? What do we see? Something like Figure 2. In this figure the shaded semi-circle is the hemisphere which is invisible in Figure 1. The definitions still apply. Now have a look at Figure 3, which is figure 2 just turned back a little towards us.

Fig. 2



Fig. 3




These three drawings (that is Figures 1, 2, and 3) show the relationship between LHA, latitude and altitude, or rather between LHA, polar distance and zenith distance, the components of the PZX triangle which we use. (The tables allow for polar distance being 90°—latitude, and zenith distance being 90° ± declination).

Figure 1 can be drawn to scale, and the components can be picked out with an accuracy of about 1°, if we so wish. I won't go into the actual method here, but I'll dish out a pamphlet to anyone who is interested in trying this out.

What about the eclipse? Figure 4 shows the situation with the sun and moon diametrically opposed. On the plane of the rational horizon, in Figure 5, if we are to illustrate the situation in this way, we must put the sun on one horizon, and the moon on the other. A line drawn between the two must pass through the zenith.

The amplitudes are identical, so declinations must be identical and opposite. (We have shown before, in these columns, that amplitude, the azimuth at rising/setting, is a function of latitude and declination only.) Also, if they are diametrically opposed, they must be on the same meridian circle, so that the total of their LHA's (E + W) must be 180°.

The criteria, therefore, are declinations equal, and opposite names. LHA's different by 180°.

See you next time.

Hedley Watson.

Fig. 4




Fig. 5




# ANNOUNCEMENT

**THE C.Y.C.A. HAS PLEASURE IN ANNOUNCING THAT A YACHT RACE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN**

**MARCH 1980**

**from**

**SYDNEY TO TAHITI (FRENCH POLYNESIA)**

**A DISTANCE OF3292 NAUTICAL MILES, WITH TWO ANTICIPATED STOPOVERS FOR VICTUALLING (ONE AT TONGA)**

**THE RACE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE FOLLOWING DIVISIONS/SECTIONS:**

**I.O.R. YACHT DIVISION**

**ARBITRARY DIVISION**

**CRUISING SECTION**

**PETER RYSDYK HAS BEEN APPOINTED PROVISIONAL RACE DIRECTOR**

# OFFSHORE SIGNALS

## New liferaft hire and safety service

P.R. Safety Services Marine, a new partnership of Peter Tilley and Rob Allen, is in the final planning stages of a new liferaft hire service, something that will be of keen interest to yachtsmen, charterers, delivery teams who aren't prepared to lay out capital for a liferaft that does not need to be 'on call' all of the time. P.R. is also a safety consulting service.

Tilley and Allen have 40 years of boating experience between them and feel this can be of benefit to boat owners who may require assistance with safety details. P.R. Safety Service Marine will provide safety assessments for individual boat owners, quotations for supply of a 'total safety package', supervision of installation of any equipment ordered, handling of Club Safety Inspections for owners, periodic safety servicing, etc.

In short, P.R. intends to take the work out of safety compliance for you. Enquiries P.R. Safety Services Marine, Careening Cove Boatshed, Milsons Point, N.S.W. (02) 929 0700.


## Automatic anchor light

Bideford Electronics Ltd. of Devon, England has developed a low-cost automatic anchor light which switches itself on at dusk and off at dawn.

The unit, measuring 90 mm × 45 mm, incorporates a photo-electric cell and requires no day-to-day attention. It can be powered by a craft's own supply or batteries, and is available in 6, 12 or 24 volt versions, supplied with a 3 metre lead. The light is protected against incorrect polarity connection and sealed to withstand the marine environment.

## Blue Water Catering

Greg Gilliam and Kerrie Williams are operating a catering service for yachtsmen who haven't the time or inclination to worry about preparing meals for crews or to do pre-voyage shopping. Blue Water Catering will supply anything or everything, from snacks to portable gourmet dinners. Upon request they will evaluate your needs and the meal-serving capabilities of your yacht, will prepare sandwiches and meals to order, and will deliver.

Both Greg and Kerrie have had considerable practical experience in ocean passages, and their Blue Water Catering service is worth knowing about—even for the weekend harbour cruiser. Telephone 389 0029, preferably after business hours.

# BOOK REVIEWS

## To Beat the Clippers

by Alec Beilly

Although it is two years since the Financial Times Clipper Race, Alec Beilly's account of the race in *To Beat the Clippers* makes fascinating reading. Four yachts started in the first leg from London to Sydney where they were joined by Australia's *Anaconda* for the leg home to England.

The race, as the title of the book implies, was to see if modern-day ocean racers could beat the time taken by the old clipper ships to do the trip from England to Australia and home again. Until the time of the Financial Times Clipper Race no one had beaten the record time of the *Patriarch,*

The book not only tells vividly of the actual race but the history of the clipper *Patriarch.* It also describes the 'Festival of Sail' regatta which took place on the Thames the week before the start of the race.

One of the most fascinating chapters is "The First Leg in Retrospect" where the skippers and navigators of *Great Britain II* and *Kriter II* were interviewed at a dinner after the race; the discussion was recorded on tape and this chapter contains a great deal of interesting detail.

*To Beat the Clippers* is magnificently illustrated with over 70 black-and-white plates as well as some superb colour photographs; all in all I thoroughly recommend it.

Peter Shipway.

# CLUB NOTES

## Commodore's Message

Dear Members,

Your Editor has asked me to set down my objectives for the Club for the year ahead. I do so in the hope that if they are seriously at variance with what you as individual Members think is best for your Club, that you will bring your views either to a Member of your Board or to the Membership as a whole, through these columns.

My broad aim is to ensure the continuing health of the Club, both physically and in spirit. For the Club, as for any other living body, these two aspects are interdependent. The former depends on our having good material facilities, namely marinas, car parking, clubhouse and the services to complement them of slipping, shipwright, bar and house. The spirit means active participation of the Members in the sport of yachting, and requires your Board to provide the sort of races, cruises and associated social functions that increase the number of Members participating in Club activities and utilising the Club's facilities.

First item on the list of physical improvements is the replacement of the Nos. 2 and 3 marinas. This work should start during April, and I ask all those Members who may be inconvenienced while this work is in progress remember that the end product will be a much safer and a more adequate structure. Our objective is to have the new jetties ready for the coming summer season.

Improved parking is no less imperative, but as the car park has to be built where the workshops, ship chandlery and shop are at present, the new workshop building to house these services has to be constucted prior to clearing the car park site. This stage of development will also cause inconvenience to Members, as we will lose the limited car parking currently available on our property. The redevelopment of the clubhouse proper cannot take place until the foregoing development has been completed, and thus is unlikely to progress past the planning stage during my term as Commodore.

Participation is the key to a healthy Club spirit, and that means not only increasing the numbers entering each race, but also actively encouraging entrants to 'hang in there' and race regularly. I know crew availability is one

of the biggest problems, particularly for boats requiring more than five persons to man them, and we will be trying to help in this matter with the appointment of a crew-co-ordinator, whose function will be to try to place those wishing to sail with those requiring sailors. As an adjunct to this, it is proposed to make available crew log books in which newcomers to the sport can have their sea miles recorded together with appropriate comments from the various skippers with whom they sail. It is also the duty of any owner who cannot for some reason sail in a particular race to try and place his crew on other boats for that race. In short, we have to help one another more often, and the Club and the sport will be the better for it.

—A. Pearson.

# Safety Inspections

As we mentioned in the February/March issue of *Offshore,* page 42, our system of inspecting yachts will change dramatically. The annual scramble to get inspected before the first ocean race or 'Hobart' will become a thing of the past.

First and foremost it should be realised by boat owners that anyone racing without a valid safety notation will have a 'no race'. Our previous rather haphazard methods have been streamlined and will be more efficient for all concerned. Here is a brief resume of our new methods.

During a particular period, somewhere in July or August before the new season commences, all boat owners usually racing will be invited to make their vessels available for inspection on a certain date (weekend) and time. So, new owners/Members, make sure your name is on the list; otherwise you will be passed over and become a tail-ender with the result that you will not be able to race in the first few races.

During this inspection which takes approximately one hour, you should have two responsible crew members (including yourself if at all possible) in attendance. All the safety gear should be laid out on one of the bunks in order of the 'tick-off' list we supply, your anchors/lines/chains on the deck, the storms'ls hanked on ready to hoist (permanent sheets on) and your radio transmitter 'fired up' and tuned, as this year our Radio Officer Keith Storey, insists that we check **all frequencies** with Middle Head O.T.C. checking station.

In the past our Inspectors had to return numerous times, as owners very seldom have had their safety gear complete. This has taken excessive time from our already-overworked volunteer Inspectors. Together with the Middle Harbour Yacht Club, with which we have a reciprocal arrangement (so far the only Club), we have decided that any subsequent inspection will be charged for by the Club. Should any owner not turn up at the allocated time, a new time can be arranged with the Inspector, but the owner will then be charged for this inspection. Our last Hobart once again showed the value of our rigid safety inspections, so please co-operate as much as possible and be pleasant about it. Our Inspectors are only doing their job and are giving their time for your safety.

Many liferaft packs will have certificates the dates of which do not correspond with the inspection date; this will be noted and several times during the season 'spot checks' will be made. Incomplete safety gear will mean automatically a 'no race', which would be hard to take if you came first or had a placing.

The Yachting Association, the M.H.Y.C. and our own Club are hard at work to bring all Clubs into line and to have a universal inspection system and uniform paperwork. This is already showing results; for instance, the Gosford Aquatic Club, with its annual Lord Howe Island Race (28th October), will follow the same procedure, using the same forms.

All owners will get ample time to prepare and the next advice you receive will be through the mail containing (a) dates and Inspectors allocated (b) full information (c) 'tick-off' list (d) Official Inspection form.

We regret that we have very little flexibility regarding dates or times due to the great number of inspections to be carried out.

For those new Members not fully aware of the requirements, please obtain the **A.Y.F. Rule Book** 1977/1981 (pages 80-106) and the C.Y.C. Sailing Programme (Safety Inspection under index). Both are available from our office.

Should there be any queries do not hesitate to contact your allocated inspector. It should also be remembered that our C.Y.C. office staff will no longer arrange inspection appointments; they are in fact, not involved until the Inspector hands the satisfactory completed inspection form in for filing.

—Peter Rysdyk
Chief Safety Inspector

## Sailing Committee

The new Sailing Committee for 1978-1979 is under the Chairmanship of Rear Commodore Joe Ward, who has been a member of the Committee off and on for seven years. Joe sails the ½ tonner *Skylark,* has raced in four Sydney-Hobarts and all in all has some 20 years in the racing game. Joe has stated his policy as being to lead the Sailing Committee along lines which will bring young crewmen back into ocean racing, specifically with the C.Y.C.A. offshore fleet, and to, increase owner participation offshore by greater emphasis on arbitrary handicap and handicap relativity between divisions.

Other members of the Committee with their respective responsibilities are:

Deputy Chairman—Gordon Marshall (technical)
Vice Commodore Kerry Roxburgh (observer)
Keith Storey (Hobart Race Director and mark laying)
John Brooks (publicity)
Alan Brown (crew co-ordinator)
David Goode (race starting and finishing)
Peter Rysdyck (safety and promotions).

In his first message in this issue of *Offshore* Commodore Tony Pearson notes a shortage of crews over the last races of the 1977/78 season and announces a new method of dealing with it, namely the appointment of a crew co-ordinator. Alan Brown has taken that position and will be responsible for finding boats for prospective crewmen and vice versa. To this end a log book system for newcomers to the sport will be established so that during their early racing days a record can be kept of experience and training to the benefit of crewmen and skippers.

If you have any friends who are interested in getting into ocean racing, either as beginners or as a switch from another branch of sailing, direct them to Alan Brown, who will find them a berth. Likewise for you skippers who have been finding yourselves short of crew, get in touch with Alan—but preferably before race day. With the winter season approaching this is the ideal time to make this system work and train newcomers for next season.

One change in the 1978/79 programme suggested by 1977 experience is to switch one of the 90 milers back from early February to early December. This should provide additional shake-down racing just prior to the Sydney-Hobart Race for new boats and crews and reduce the tendency for raw crews to make their ocean racing debut in the Sydney-Hobart Race.

A new winter innovation will be radio

training lectures which will increase radio expertise within the fleet, an improvement which will be welcomed by anyone who has suffered through a drawn out radio schedule during a long ocean race. The course will train interested members to 3rd Class Radio Operators standard.

The Sailing Committee intends to continue last season's special self-righting tests as an important phase in research and development of the I.O.R. To this end, self-righting tests will be conducted on selected boats on a voluntary basis, voluntary on the part of the owner that is, and the data from these experiences will go toward the refinement of self righting formula. Gordon Marshall will be supervising self-righting tests on *Relentless* and *Weather Report,* amongst others in Sydney, and in Melbourne *B-195's* characteristics will be investigated.

Sufficient interest has been demonstrated by Members in twilight racing to make its introduction almost a formality next season. Coincident with the commencement of daylight saving time next summer, twilight racing will commence from the C.Y.C.A. on Wednesday evenings. Our race starting organisation under David Goode is currently stretched to breaking point during summer months, so twilight racing will be subject to the availability of race supervisory crews, and these do not grow on trees. Accordingly David Goode has added another responsibility to an already heavy burden by undertaking to train race officials, and we need volunteers for the job. We will need help if mid-week twilight racing is to become a reality.

Peter Rysdyk continues with the organisation and promotion for the 1979 Sydney-Noumea Race and reports enthusiastic support from C.N.C., Noumea, and sponsorship from U.T.A. is in the offing. The behaviour of crews after the last Noumea Race impressed our French Pacific neighbours so much that they actually want us back, which is something of a switch in the Australian overseas image and a refreshing change at that. This happy state of affairs has resulted in the prospect of a well organised and patronised race with a big welcome at the Noumea end.

On Sunday 17 April, 78 yachts lined up for the start of this epic event. The starters included the cream of the ocean racing fleet with *Ragamuffin, Nyamba, Salacia II* and *Margaret Rintoul II,* all Admiral's Cup contestants; *Helsal* and *Kurrewa IV (Morna),* both Sydney to Hobart Race record holders; and *Diamond Cutter,* the winner of the last Sydney to Brisbane Race.

John Keelty *(Cherana)* did an excellent job as the chief handicapper for the 5 divisions, with less than 20 minutes separating the boats at the finish.

David Goode and his efficient team managed the start in a brisk 15 knot sou'wester with the National President of the Scout Association of Australia, Sir Vincent Fairfax, firing the starting gun from the flagship *Sundowner* (Sir Theo Kelly) off Clark Island. Handicaps at the start saw Commander 'Spike' Ross in *Soliloquy,* a beautiful old gaff rigger, lead the fleet to Manly with *Helsal* and *Kurrewa IV* in a match race starting after the 4 divisions. There had been intermittent rain for the 3 weeks prior to the race, but, fortunately, although the day was overcast, no rain fell.

There was a big swell coming through the heads, and the unusual scene of 10 surf board riders cracking waves into Neilson Park was an indication of the harbour conditions prevailing on the day.

No.1 division was won by *Balandra* (W.R. Carpenter) with *Wing Nut* (G.W. Ingate) in command and a mixed crew of semi-professionals and rank amateurs. In second place was *Kingurra* (Sir William [illegible]ttingell) with a very efficient family crew and Ann Wilson as navigator. In third place was *Agression* (John Gilliam). 'Big Bad' Greg and 15 enthusiastic guests sailed a great race. *Trevassa* missed the South Reef mark and graciously withdrew.

Race organiser Geoff Lee, International Commissioner for the Scout Association of Australia, showed ingenuity in providing scout knives as the prizes.

No. 2 division was won by *Teal (G.W. Stewart), second was Rogue* (V.D'Emilio), and third, *Rush* (M. Clifford).

No. 3 division was a closely fought contest with a large number of ½ tonners having an interesting race. *Fuzzy Duck* (R. Gregg/D. Fuller) was the winner from *Chauvinist* (Dr.P. Winkler) second, and *Skylark* (J. Ward) coming third.

The cruising division somewhat resembled a race for troop carriers. Brian James in *Swifty* was the winner; *Varuna (Dr John Musgrove) took second place with a representative crew from the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital; and third was Anna Drie* (Hans Kropp). John Musgrove tells us that *Varuna* has been in the family for over 40 years.

*Marabou* (Keith Storey) acted as the finishing boat with race officials Ray Hollingsworth and Jill McLay assisted by 2 sea scouts doing a sterling job.

There was some talk of a protest being lodged against some yachts who failed to keep the South Reef gas buoy to starboard, but on perusing the sailing instructions, the protest had to be lodged with a dozen bottles of champagne (not returnable) with the finishing boat. It is understandable that there was some hesitancy.

It was good to see Boy Messenger competing with *Bachus* with about 40 people on board.

Jack Rooklyn's*Nicky O'Dea* carried a number of spectators but the prize went to *Peanuts Junk* owned by Barry Wain and Walt Kindt, which had the distinction of having Kerry Doyle, former Miss Australia, as the hostess. At one stage before the start *Peanuts* hoisted a small fores'l and looked like being a competitor.

Shortly after the start on *Ragamuffin* Sid Fischer said "It's a scout race so we should have a scout in command" and handed the sea scout the wheel as his eyes grew to twice their normal size.

Mike Fletcher (Elvstrom Sails) and Lindsay May did a great job in a runabout delivering bottles of champagne to the skippers during the manouvering period before the start. One skipper was heard to remark: "This is the only race where everybody gets a prize, and before the event even starts".

It was an outstanding success and the response from owners was very pleasing and a credit to the yachting fraternity. The C.Y.C.A. made *Offshore* available to start the races.

An amount of $5,000 was donated to the National Scout Brotherhood Fund as a result of The Great Scout Yacht Race and an Art Union for a Range Rover produced an additional amount of $1,400 for the fund.

The yacht owners, crews, hostesses and guests all proved that they ar "GOOD SCOUTS".

# MARINA NEWS

**by Jack North**

Men go down to the sea in ships and they know why they go. But it's no good asking them why because they won't tell you. Once you put the question they realise you just can't understand, and kindly switch to some simple subject like grog, or the dreadful price of anti-fouling.

Anyone who gets 'round to reading this will understand the sea, and will know why four young Norwegians spent four years of their lives in just building a yacht. Dag Pettersen designed the ship; she was his first and, he says, his only design. But he must be pretty confident of his ability as a designer, for he's sailed all the way from Norway to the C.Y.C marina in the boat, and intends to go home to Norway in her.

*Preciosa* they named the yacht, after a famous old barque from Drammem (pronounced Drummen). The yacht's name is Spanish and means precious or dearly beloved. She's built of aluminium, 55 feet by 13 feet beam, and draws 9 feet. A 70 horsepower Hercules diesel kicks her along under power, but her crew reckon this donk is bit of a joke. They can't get spares for it anywhere and spent the whole of their time in the Marquesas under sail alone.

*Preciosa* is a ketch with wooden spars and admiralty-pattern anchors while below decks she is as comfortable as any yacht that size can be. Much of her timber comes from her namesake. Odd Karlssen says she reminds him of the ski huts where he spent his earliest days.

She sailed from Oslo a couple of years back on a random sort of voyage. Kiel in Germany was her first stop. Then came England, Spain, the Canary Islands, the Caribbean, Rio de Janeiro and the Faulklands. From there it was Cape Horn with some horrible weather from ahead. After the West Coast of South America and Valparaiso the yacht reached westward into the Pacific, including Easter Island in her itinerary. She arrived in Sydney on 11th February last after a fourteen day crossing from Auckland.

Her crew, which consists of her builders-owners-skippers, comprises Per Omdal, Ola Heining, Dag Pettersen and Kjell Myrann. Per stands 6'4" which is tall in any company. A couple more hands have been signed on in Sydney and the yacht is sailing home by way of the Barrier Reef and the Cape of Good Hope.

All four skippers are also navigators, which can be a bit much in a small yacht. Maybe you've sailed with just two navigators. They never come up with identical answers, and as neither will speak first, you never know where you are. With four navigators the confusion is many times confounded according to Per Omdal, who usually ends up trusting to his own results. This system seems to work for the land has always turned up where it ought to.

Odd Karlssen, well known on the marina as the last of the Vikings, will join the ship in Casablanca for Oslo so that he can (I quote his very words) "come home like a true Viking."

* * *

*Wooshee III* is another recent visitor from overseas and although she wears the Canadian flag she hasn't been there yet. A Camper and Nicholson 31 launched in March, 1977 at Portsmouth, England, she is still on her delivery voyage to Vancouver. Owner Dete Thomson decided he'd do it the long way round, by way of Capetown and Sydney.

This fibreglass sloop sailed from Falmouth on 15th June, 1977, calling in at Madeira, the Canary Islands, Rio de Janeiro and Capetown. The passage of 7,100 miles from Capetown to Sydney took 66 days, the yacht arriving at the marina on 27th February last. She struck bad weather in the Roaring Forties but it was always from astern. For a while she ran five knots under bare poles.

*Wooshee III* might potter around Sydney and Broken Bay waters for a while; her 22 horse Yanmar diesel will be very useful if she does. But Dete will most likely head for New Zealand on the next stage of his passage to Vancouver.

* * *

The sloop *Mazurek* was built at the Joseph Conrad Yacht Yard in Gdansk, Poland—that is pronounced Gdaesk for those of you who aren't too well up in the Cyrillic alphabet.

Of fibreglass construction, *Mazurek* is 9.5 metres by 2.7 metres which, if my mathematics are correct, is 31'8" by 9 feet. But she looks narrower than that owing to a considerable quarter-rounding at the gunwale. A 10 horse Volvo is used for mooring and suchlike harbour manoeuvres.

When *Mazurek* arrived at the marina on 10.12.76, by way of the Panama Canal, her crew, Krystyna Chojinowska-Liskiewicz, was half way through her voyage round the world. Very recently it was reported that she arrived back home, thus becoming the first woman to complete a single-handed circumnavigation.

* * *

*Monomotapa* is a South African yacht. A Hartley Ferro-cement hull designed at 38'6" she was stretched to 40 feet in building. Her beam is 11'6", she is sloop rigged and a Perkins 417 provides auxiliary power.

Tony Jaques and his wife Eppie built *Monomotapa* in South Africa, a job which took 13½ months. According to Tony their only helper was an African lad who had never seen a boat and could not really comprehend what it was he was helping to build. It was a big day for him when he saw the yacht enter the water at Durban in August, 1977.

The passage from Durban to Fremantle took 32 days, 18 of which were stormy to say the least. She appears to have been in the southern Indian Ocean at about the same time as *Wooshee III* and had a delivery crew for that stage of the voyage. A new crew brought her round to Sydney and she arrived at the marina on 16th February last. The Jacques family will probably join the flock of north-bound yachts for Barrier Reef waters soon. Their movements after that have not been decided.

*Monomotape* is named after a kingdom which existed on the Mozambique coast of Africa in the seventeenth century.

* * *

# if you've heard a rumour we're expanding

Mascot airfreight terminal



The new Brisbane terminal

Opened September: Adelaide

# you've heard right!

whether you import or export, manufacture or distribute ... the expanding, service-minded Mitchell Cotts Organisation will take a load off your mind. Because we know you want nation-wide service plus top international contacts.

**Mitchell Cotts Freight** Which is exactly what we have built. And are continuing to build ... to ensure you get service with a style uniquely "MC".

Mitchell Cotts Freight (Aust.) Pty. Ltd.
Sydney • Melbourne • Brisbane • Adelaide
Agents world-wide.
A member of the world-wide Mitchell Cotts Group.